The continued risks of unsecured public Wi-Fi and why users keep using it: Evidence from Japan by Sombatruang, N et al.
The continued risks of unsecured public Wi-Fi and
why users keep using it: Evidence from Japan
Nissy Sombatruang∗, Youki Kadobayashi†, M. Angela Sasse‡, Michelle Baddeley§ and Daisuke Miyamoto†
∗Department of Security and Crime Science
University College London, London, UK
E-mail: uctznso@ucl.ac.uk
†Laboratory for Cyber Resilience
Nara Institute of Science and Technology, Nara, Japan
E-mail: {youki-k, daisu-mi}@is.naist.jp
‡Department of Computer Science
University College London, London, UK
E-mail: a.sasse@ucl.ac.uk
§Institute for Choice
University of South Australia, Adelaide, Australia
E-mail: michelle.baddeley@unisa.edu.au
Abstract—Many people find public Wi-Fi networks convenient
but these networks harbor security and privacy risks. As public
knowledge of these risks becoming common, we investigated
whether the risks were still at large and what factors influenced
users to use the networks — being the first study to draw evidence
from Japan. Adapting the methodology from a previous study
in the UK, we first set up an experimental open public Wi-Fi
network at 11 locations in downtown Nara and captured Internet
traffic. From approximately 7.7 million packets captured from
196 unique mobile devices during a 150-hour experiment, we
found private photos, emails, documents, and login credentials
being transmitted in clear text without encryption — confirming
that not only did many applications still fail to encrypt data-in-
motion but also did many users continue to use unsecured public
Wi-Fi networks. We then used a scenario-based survey to examine
factors affecting the users’ decision to use the networks. From
103 participants, we found that the desire to conserve mobile
data — a form of resource preservation heuristic — instigated a
risk-taking attitude and influenced participants, especially among
those usually having a small monthly data plan, to use unsecured
public Wi-Fi networks. Female and those having finish high-
school only, were also more likely to use the networks.
Index Terms—Public Wi-Fi Security, Human-Centered Secu-
rity, Users Decision-Making, Resource Preservation Heuristic
I. INTRODUCTION
Public Wi-Fi networks provide access to many services for
users on the move. However, while offering convenient access
at little to no cost, most public Wi-Fi networks harbor security
and privacy risks — especially open networks which required
no authentication and provided no encryption. Numerous sto-
ries have appeared in the media (e.g. [4], [27], [36], [26], [28]).
Many theoretical studies also support such claims ( [1], [3],
[32], [38], [40]); so does empirical evidence ( [5], [6], [9],
[16], [19], [33]).
Despite growing public knowledge about the risks, public
Wi-Fi networks continue to expand. In Japan, there were about
500,000 hotspots in 2016 [39], are 800,000 in 2018 [13], and
are expected to grow further, especially in the anticipation of
the 2020 Tokyo Olympics [23]. But to date, no previous studies
have investigated either the risks or the factors influencing
users to use unsecured public Wi-Fi in this country. We are
the first to address this gap.
To this end, we adapted and improved upon the work of
Sombatruang et al. [33] originally conducted in the UK in
2016 in the Japanese town of Nara. We set up our own
experimental free open public Wi-Fi network for 150 hours
during November and December 2017, and inspected the
traffic for sensitive information that was transmitted insecurely.
Our findings confirmed that the risks of public Wi-Fi in Japan
were still at large — worrying that despite the country has
done well in many aspects of cyber security such as having
one of the lowest malware infection rates [35], public Wi-Fi
risks may have been overlooked.
Understanding the factors influencing users to use these
unsecured networks is an important first step to mitigate the
risks. We again adapted a scenario-based survey from the same
previous study [33], adopted part of their analysis method, and
added new tests to examine factors in more depth.
First, we investigated the role of the desire to preserve
mobile data, hereafter called resource preservation heuristic.
Sombatruang et al. [33] originated this idea, showing that
female preferred public Wi-Fi to save mobile data. However,
their study did not investigate this heuristic in depth —
disabling us to observe its true effect in the decision-making.
We aimed to address this gap. We considered this heuristic
important, especially now that many people have mobile data,
a more secure means to use the Internet — but the trade-off
mechanism for choosing between mobile data and a potentially
unsecured public Wi-Fi network is not very well understood.
We consulted the literature from economic and psychology
which have previously examined how the constraint of re-
sources captures the attention, triggers intrusive thoughts, and
creates cognitive loads which could lead to myopic decision-
making ( [31], [42], [20], [25], [34], [24], [29]). Our findings
support this notion. The constraint of mobile data instigated
resource preservation heuristic, leading to the decisions to use
a potentially unsecured public Wi-Fi.
Next, we examined how the perceived risks public Wi-Fi
affected the decision-making. Evidence from previous studies
are limited and inconsistent. One study argued that users of
public Wi-Fi networks were not aware of the risk [19]. Others
show that users were aware of the risks but did not think the
risks would be realised ( [30], [37], [21]). Sombatruang et al.
[33] did not statistically test this factor either and so we did and
found that it did not significantly affect the decision-making.
We also investigated the roles of demographic factors and
found a significant relationship between gender and education
level and the tendency to use public Wi-Fi.
The paper is structured as follows: Section II and III
introduced related work and methodology, respectively. The
results are in Section IV. We discussed the application of our
work, its limitation, and possible future work in Section V,
before presenting the conclusion in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Our study related to the study of public Wi-Fi risks and of
factors affecting user’s decisions to use the networks.
A. Security and privacy risks of unsecured Wi-Fi networks
The security and privacy risks of unsecured public Wi-Fi
networks are not new. The wireless transmission nature of Wi-
Fi makes the data travelling through these networks vulnerable
to various types of attack such as man-in-the-middle ( [1], [3],
[32], [38]) and eavesdropping ( [19], [16]), especially when
the networks do not use encryption. Many free public Wi-Fi
fall into this category [2]. Even with an encryption standard
such as WPA2, Wi-Fi is not immune from vulnerabilities [40].
Empirical evidence is also mounting. Cheng et al. [6] found
leaked sensitive user information while using public Wi-Fi at
various airports — worrying given that many travelers use
public Wi-Fi at airports. Chen et al. [5] also found sensitive
data such as medical history and family income leaking from
a Wi-Fi side channel. Some of these data are highly sensitive
in nature and could be subject to data protection law in
many jurisdictions. F-Secure [9] provided further evidence,
capturing one username and password in the clear during a 30-
min free Wi-Fi experiment in central London (UK) in 2014.
Sombatruang et al. [33] also found one online dating app
transmitted information such as name, date of birth, and sexual
orientation unencrypted, in a similar experiment in 2016.
We wanted to investigate whether these risks were still at
large in Japan, given the growing knowledge of public Wi-Fi
risks and many media reports (e.g. [4], [27], [36], [26], [28]).
Being the first study in Japan would also give local insight,
especially useful to the Japanese authorities whose interest in
cyber security have grown substantively in the past few years.
B. Factors affecting a user’s decision to use public Wi-Fi
Understanding factors influencing users to use unsecured
public Wi-Fi is an important first step to mitigate the risks.
The perceived risk of using the networks is a good starting
point. Klasnja et al. [19] found that public Wi-Fi users did
not know the risk involved. But public knowledge may have
evolved since their study in 2009. Seigneur et al. [30] gave
an alternative view. Only 10% of their participants responded
“No” when asked whether they knew that a Wi-Fi hotspot
could be easily impersonated. But 58.4% responded “I don’t
care”. Perhaps, public Wi-Fi users did know about the risks
but they simply did not care. McShane et al. [21] supported
the claim; 25% of their participants admitted to have used
unsecured public Wi-Fi for financial purpose despite security
concern being the top most common reason for not using it.
Swanson et al. [37] offered another explanation. Their
participants said they used public Wi-Fi because, despite
awareness of certain risks, they did not believe the risks
would be realised. Participants in Klasnja et al. [19]’s study
echoed this feeling of invincibility, believing their devices had
sufficient security measures to mitigate the risks — worrying
as many users do not update their software ( [17], [41], [43]).
Other studies show that trust in public Wi-Fi lies in the cues
— the environment when the users connect to the networks.
Ferreira et al. [11] found that the name of Wi-Fi affected
user’s trust. Kindberg et al. [18] found that users could be
influenced by location-relevant images displayed on the log-in
page. Ferreira et al. [10] and Jeske et al. [15] also showed that
a security padlock next to the Wi-Fi name promoted trust.
Another important factor is the constraint of mobile data but
it was largely overlooked until the work of Sombatruang et al.
[33]. They initially tested whether users’ decision to use public
Wi-Fi aligned with the expected utility theory. But they also
found that more females than males preferred public Wi-Fi to
save mobile data — shedding new light of the importance
of mobile data preservation heuristic. However, their study
did not investigate this heuristic in depth — disabling us to
understand the true effect and the situation which prompts the
heuristic. We wanted to address this gap. Data from Japan
would also test if the heuristic has a universal nature.
To pave a foundation, we consulted the economic and
psychology literature studying decision-making of those with
constrained financial resources. We considered them and the
users with constrained mobile data to be most comparable.
Previous studies found that scarcity — the state of not
having enough — has many hidden costs including the reduced
cognitive bandwidth needed to think clearly and effectively (
[42], [25], [24], [29]). Shah et al. [31] used lab experiments
and showed that financial difficulties created a cognitive load
which could lead poor participants to make riskier sub-optimal
financial decisions. This may explain the findings from Som-
batruang et al. [33]’s study. The thought of running out of data
may also create a similar cognitive load which led participants
to take risks from using a potentially unsecured public Wi-Fi.
Mani et al. [20] provided another evidence. In the lab
experiments, they found inducing thoughts about finances
reduced cognitive performance among poor participants. Their
fieldwork experiments in India confirmed the theory. The same
sugarcane farmer did worse on a cognitive performance test
before the harvest when money was scarce. Being poor was
stressful and so cognitive load was diverted towards worrying
about the difficult circumstances at hands. Spears [34] also
noted similar findings. Participants, assigned to receive one or
two household items for free, did worse in the cognitive tests
than did those assigned to get more free items. Having a small
budget taxed their minds (from having to choose items they
wanted most), leading to poor cognitive performance.
These related works all point to one notion. The constraint
of resources introduces cognitive load and trigger intrusive
thoughts that could lead to sub-optimal decision-making.
Hence, we hypothesized that the constraints of mobile data too
would trigger an intrusive thoughts and influence participants
to take risks of using potentially unsecured public Wi-Fi.
In this section, we present the related work. The next
section, Section III, discusses the methodology.
III. METHODOLOGY
Our study has two parts: the risks of public Wi-Fi and
factors influencing users to use it. We adapted and improved
the methodology from the work of Sombatruang et al. [33].
A. Security and privacy risks of unsecured public Wi-Fi
We set up a free open public Wi-Fi network (SSID =
.Free JP Wi-Fi) and monitored traffic for 150 hours during
November and December 2017 at 11 locations in downtown
Nara (Appendix A). The network consisted of a laptop running
on Kali Linux OS (4.13.0-kali1-686-pae), an iPad (OS 10.3.3),
a data sim card by IIJmio, a USB cable for connecting an
iPad to a laptop, and a customized Python-based captive portal
application1. We replaced a Windows-based setup previously
used in Sombatruang et al.’s study with a Unix-based as many
newer mobile OS did not detect Windows-based hotspots. No
registration or authentication was required to use our network.
However, potential users were routed to a login page which
forced a user to accept the terms and conditions of usage
before using the network. We considered this setup the closest
design to many real-life open unsecured public Wi-Fi.
We used Wireshark (v.2.4.1), a network analyser software,
to capture and analyse the traffic passing through our Wi-Fi
network. We also used Network Miner (v.2.2.0.0), a forensic
software not previously used in the work of Sombatruang et
al. to reconstruct data traffic more effectively. We examined
traffic that was transmitted via HTTP, an unencrypted protocol,
and via Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP), Post Office
Protocol (POP), and Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP),
the last three of which could reveal the content and the
credentials of emails if not configured properly.
1Adapted from www.github.com/AloysAugustin/captive portal
B. Factors affecting users’ decisions to use unsecured Wi-Fi
We used a scenario-based online survey which asked par-
ticipants to decide whether they would use public Wi-Fi in
hypothetical scenarios. We launched the survey in November
2017 and completed the data collection in the same month.
1) Recruitment and participants: We hired Macromill2 to
recruit participants. The firm has a diverse demographic of
10 million participants nationwide which would allow well-
balanced samples. Eligible participants were restricted to only
those living in Japan and aged at least 18, all of whom had at
least one mobile device, and had used public Wi-Fi in the past,
according to the self-assessed pre-screening questions. Each
participant received a reward3 for their participation. A total
of 103 participants with diverse background were recruited
(Appendix B), all of them have Japanese nationality.
2) Survey questions and platform: We adopted the eight
scenarios from Sombatruang et al.’s study [33] but changed
some elements to accommodate local environment e.g. re-
placed Whatsapp with LINE, a more popular app in Japan.
We translated the survey to Japanese and pilot tested it with a
student and a staff at the institution, and with Macromill staff.
The eight scenarios covered different transaction types,
degree of urgency, and location of the scenario (Table I),
allowing us to examine how participants made decision in
different contexts. All participants were given the same eight
scenarios but the order of the cases were randomized by the
system to minimize the anchoring effect and response biases.
In each scenario, we asked participants to choose whether
they would use the Internet and, if so, by free open public Wi-
Fi or mobile data plan/roaming, supposing they have 100%,
75%, 50%, and 25% left on data allowance. These constraints
would allow us to examine how resource preservation heuristic
influenced the decision to use unsecured public Wi-Fi.
The descriptions and the rationale for each scenario are
listed below. Paragraphs I, II, and the questions from scenario
I applied to all other scenarios, except for 1GB data plan
(¥1500) was replaced with 20MB (¥2000) data roaming plan
and the transaction size of 100MB was replaced with 2MB in
scenario V-VIII which placed participants outside Japan.
Scenario I:“You are waiting at a train station in Japan.
When you arrive, you see that the train is running 1 hour late.
2A Japanese marketing research firm (www.group.macromill.com)
3The amount is commercial data and is kept confidential by Macromill
TABLE I SCENARIOS TYPES
Scenario Type of Transaction Urgency Location
I Non-financial Non-urgent In Japan
II Non-financial Urgent In Japan
III Financial Non-urgent In Japan
IV Financial Urgent In Japan
V Non-financial Non-urgent Outside Japan
VI Non-financial Urgent Outside Japan
VII Financial Non-urgent Outside Japan
VIII Financial Urgent Outside Japan
You want to check messages on messaging apps (e.g. LINE)
or emails but you do NOT urgently need to contact anyone in
particular. You last checked your messages 2 hours ago.”
Paragraph I: “...You then scan for Wi-Fi hotspots and find
a free open public Wi-Fi network you never used before. This
network is working properly. No registration or password is
required to use it. You can use the Wi-Fi as long as you like.”
Paragraph II: “Suppose you also have a 4G data plan. You
have paid ¥1500 for 1GB which has no expiration date. The
4G network works properly. Using the Internet will use about
100MB of your data plan (i.e. 10% of 1GB allowance). (To
illustrate, 1 min of a standard video clip is 5MB.)”
Question: “Would you use the Internet and by which mean?”
1) You have 1GB left on your mobile data plan
• Yes, via free Wi-Fi.
• Yes, via the data plan.
• No, I will not connect to the Internet.
2) You have 0.75GB (75% of 1GB) left on data plan
3) You have 0.50GB (50% of 1GB) left on data plan
4) You have 0.25GB (25% of 1GB) left on data plan
In scenario I, we placed participants in Japan, a familiar
environment. We asked whether they would make non-urgent
non-financial transactions and, if so, by which mean. We
hypothesized that as data allowance decreased, participants
would exhibit a risk-taking attitude and choose public Wi-Fi.
Scenario II: “You are waiting for a train home (in Japan)
late in the evening when you realise you have lost the keys to
the apartment you share with a friend. You know the friend
will leave the flat before you arrive to catch a flight on a
2-week vacation. You call her but she does not answer. You
can call a locksmith service but it will be expensive. You can
contact your friend via a messaging app on her iPad.”
In scenario II, we also placed participants in Japan, and
asked them whether they would make non-financial transac-
tions. But with time pressure, we hypothesized that they would
be unable to assess the situation effectively and be more likely
to take risks from a potentially unsecured public Wi-Fi.
Scenario III: “You are working in a town in Japan away
from home and have decided to catch a movie at a cinema
close to where you work. You buy a ticket an hour before the
show starts, and want to use the time to have a dinner. While
eating, you recall that you have to pay for a holiday package,
else it will be cancelled and you will lose expensive deposit.
It is due in 5 days. You can pay via Internet banking only.”
In this scenario, we asked participants whether they would
make financial transactions in a non-urgent scenario. As in
scenario I, we hypothesized that participants would choose
public Wi-Fi as data allowance depleted. But the sensitivity of
financial transactions would made them more cautious about
the risks and less likely to choose public Wi-Fi.
Scenario IV: “You are working in a town in Japan away
from home and have decided to catch a movie at a cinema
close to where you work. You buy a ticket an hour before the
show starts, and want to use the time to have a dinner. While
eating, you recall that you have to pay for a holiday package,
else it will be cancelled and you will lose an expensive deposit.
It is due today and will be too late by the time you arrive back
at the hotel. You can pay via Internet banking only.”
In scenario IV, we asked participants whether they would
use public Wi-Fi to make financial transactions under time
pressure. We hypothesized that the pressure would affect their
decision but the sensitivity of transactions would deter them.
Scenarios V-VIII were similar to scenarios I-IV, except
that participants were placed in Madagascar, allowing us to
assess the effect of surrounding environments on the decision-
making. We hypothesized that participants would be cautious
of the risks in Madagascar and hesitated to choose public Wi-
Fi, despite expensive data roaming. But as the data allowance
depleted, we expected more participants to take the risks.
Scenario V: “You are on a 2-week holiday in Madagascar.
When you arrive at a train station, you see that the train
you want to catch is running 1 hour late. You want to check
messages on messaging apps (e.g. LINE) or emails but you do
NOT urgently need to contact anyone in particular. You last
checked messages about 2 hours ago.”
Scenario VI: “You are waiting for a train at a station in
Madagascar late in the evening when you realise you lost the
keys to a friend’s house you stay. You know the friend will
leave his house before you arrive to catch his flight for a 3-
day business trip. You call him but he does not answer. You
can call a locksmith service but will be expensive. Suppose you
can contact your friend via a messaging app on his iPad.”
Scenario VII: “You have decided to join a walking tour in
Madagascar. You arrive at a meeting point 1 hour early and
want to use the time to have lunch. While eating, you recall
that you have to pay for your next holiday, else it will be
cancelled and you will lose an expensive deposit. It is due in
5 days. You can pay via Internet banking only.”
Scenario VIII: “You have decided to join a walking tour
in Madagascar. You arrive at a meeting point 1 hour early
and want to use the time to have lunch. While eating, you
recall that you have to pay for your next holiday, else it will
be cancelled and you will lose an expensive deposit. It is due
today and will be too late by the time you get back at the
hotel. You can pay via Internet banking only.”
At the end of each scenario, we asked participants to
rate how they perceived the risk that their data could be
compromised via mobile data, and via free public Wi-Fi on
a scale of 0% to 100%, 0% being not very likely and 100%
being very likely. This would allow us to assess the effect of
the perceived risks on decision-making.
To optimize data quality, we embedded rules such as making
questions mandatory and attaching a picture related to the
scenario to make it more intuitive. We also tested the survey
on different platform (i.e. laptop, tablet, and smart phones).
3) Statistical analysis methods: We analyzed three factors
potentially affecting the decisions to use public Wi-Fi: mobile
data preservation heuristic, perceived risks of unsecured public
Wi-Fi, and demographic factors. The first two factors were
not statistically tested in depth in Sombatruang et al.’s study,
and so we added a Cochran’s Q Test and an independent
samples T-Test. The same binary logistic regression was used
on demographics factors. We ran all analysis using SPSS.
C. Ethics Approval
We seeked approval from the IRBs of the institutions.
For the Wi-Fi experiment, permission was granted provided
that participants gave consent by accepting the terms and
conditions of using our Wi-Fi network through a captive portal,
explaining that they agree they were at least 18 years old and
data such as IP address, MAC address, and network traffic
would be collected. The collected data, stored in an encrypted
drive, were accessible only to the research team.
For the survey, permission was granted given that data were
collected anonymously and participants were explained about
the study and gave consent. None of our questions asked for
personally identifiable information. We also showed details
about our study and a consent form at the start of the survey.
IV. RESULTS
We reported findings from the public Wi-Fi experiment and
the survey in this section. Each is discussed in turn.
A. Security and privacy risks of unsecured public Wi-Fi
From approximately 7.7 million Wi-Fi packets captured
from 196 mobile devices, we found data, which we considered
sensitive, transmitted insecurely without encryption. Some of
these data are highly sensitive and hence have been obscured.
1) Images: We found one online dating app transmitted
images using HTTP which provided no encryption. We recon-
structed the traffic and found 108 photos of the app users (an
example in Fig. 1). Although these images can be viewed by
anyone using the online dating application, some users may
not want to share them with non-users of the app — especially
in Japan where online dating is not common [8].
2) Search history: We found a stock checking system of
one company transmitting its product search history without
encryption via HTTP (Fig. 2). This system was for private use;
hence, data could be commercially sensitive. We also found
the credentials of the user making this search (Section IV-A4).
3) Emails and documents: We captured 57 email messages
being transmitted in clear text using Simple Mail Transfer
Protocol (SMTP) and Post Office Protocol (POP) (examples
in Fig. 3) — among which attached 4 MS Word files (Fig. 4).
4) Credentials: We captured various forms of credentials.
First, we found a password, in clear text, to open an encrypted
file attached in one of the emails captured (Fig. 5). We
also found one server’s authentication token being sent using
HTTP Basic Authentication (Fig. 6). This scheme transmits
credentials as user ID/password pair, encoded using base64
which takes binary data and turns it into text. The encoded
text is embedded unencrypted in the HTTP header.
Next, we captured a login credential from a stock checking
system of one company being transmitted via HTTP (Fig. 7).
Finally, we found three pairs of unencrypted login credentials
via POP, SMTP, and IMAP email protocols (Fig. 8).
B. Factors affecting users decision
1) Mobile data allowance: First, we tested whether partici-
pants would be more inclined to use unsecured public Wi-Fi as
the data allowance depleted in each scenario. We performed a
Cochran’s Q test 1, to test whether the observed differences in
the proportion of participants deciding to use public Wi-Fi as
data allowance depleted (from 100% to 75%, 50%, and 25%)
were statistically different. We checked that our data met the
four4 assumptions needed for Cochran’s Q Test.
T = k(k − 1)((
k∑
j=1
(xj − (N/k))2)/(
b∑
i=1
xi(k − xi))) (1)
Where k is the number of proportion to be observed (i.e. 1.0,
0.75, 0.50 and 0.25), b is the number of participants, Xj is
the column total for the jth proportion, Xi is the row total
for the ith participant, N is the grand total.
We found that the proportion of participants choosing public
Wi-Fi (WWiFi) generally increased as the mobile data al-
lowance depleted (Fig. 9-10). But, the differences observed
were statistically significant only in scenario IV and VIII
which involved urgent financial transactions. For the remaining
scenarios, the increased proportions could be due to chance.
In scenario IV which placed participants in Japan, the
WWiFi increased from 52.43% to 53.40%, 56.31%, and
59.22% as the remaining data allowance decreased from 100%
to 75%, 50%, and 25%, respectively (Fig. 9). Cochran’s Q
test determined that the differences observed were statistically
significant (x2(3) = 10.55, p < 0.01). In scenario VIII which
placed participants outside Japan, fewer participants chose
public Wi-Fi — aligning with our hypothesis that participants
would be wary of the risks in Madagascar. As the data
allowance decreased from 100% and 75% to 50%, and 25%,
the WWiFi increased from 44.66% to 49.51%, and 55.34%
(x2(3) = 8.95, p < 0.05), respectively (Fig. 10).
However, an interesting pattern emerged. The increased in
WWiFi were statistically significant pervasively among the
41. One dependent with two possible dichotomous values (i.e. using or not-
using public Wi-Fi), 2. At least three categorical related groups (i.e. 1.0, 0.75,
0.50 and 0.25), 3. Random samples, 4. Sufficiently large samples (n = 103).
Fig. 1 Wi-Fi traffic of an image from one online dating app
Fig. 2 An example of Wi-Fi traffic containing product search history
Fig. 3 Email messages reconstructed from traffic captured
Fig. 4 Attached documents among the email messages captured
Fig. 5 A password of an encrypted document sent via an email
Fig. 6 A pair of credentials embedded in the HTTP header
Fig. 7 A pair of username and password from a web-based stock
checking system being transmitted in clear text via HTTP
Fig. 8 Three pairs of email account’s username and password
transmitted in clear text via POP3, SMTP, and IMAP
data poor (those having less than 4 GB/month data on their
real-life mobile device) but not among the data rich (those
having at least 4GB/month). The 4GB/month cut-off is the
median in our data set and we considered this data plan to be
Fig. 9 Proportion of WWiFi in scenario I-IV (**significant at p < 0.01)
Fig. 10 Proportion ofWWiFi in scenario V-VIII (*significant at p < 0.05)
large enough for an ordinary user to not be too worry about
data preservation.
In scenario I, which involved making non-urgent non-
financial transactions, the proportions of the data poor deciding
to use public Wi-Fi (Wpoor) increased from 55.32% to 59.57%,
61.70%, and 68.09% (x2(3) = 9.78, p < 0.05) as the data
allowance decreased from 100% to 75%, 50%, and 25% (Fig.
11). In scenario II, which applied a time pressure, Wpoor
increased significantly from 59.57% to 68.09% (x2(3) = 9.00,
p < 0.05) as the data allowance depleted from 100% to 75%,
and from 50% to 25% (Fig. 11). The 25% cut-off point seemed
to heavily prompt the risk-taking attitude.
For financial transactions in scenario III, Wpoor increased
from 53.19% to 57.45%, and 61.70% (x2(3) = 9.43, p <
0.05) as the allowance reduced from 100% and 75% to 50%,
and 25% (Fig. 12). With a time pressure in scenario IV, Wpoor
increased from 55.32% to 57.45%, and 65.96% (x2(3) = 8.03,
p < 0.05) as the allowance reduced from 100% to 75%,
and 50% and 25%. Again, the resource preservation heuristic
reached its peak at 25% (Fig. 12). None of the differences
among the data rich (Wrich) was statistically significant,
suggesting the increase could be due to chance.
When the scenarios placed participants in Madagascar, both
the Wpoor and Wrich also generally increased as data roaming
allowance depleted. But, as hypothesized, fewer of them did
Fig. 11 Proportion of Wpoor and Wrich in case I-II (*significant at
p < 0.05, npoor = 47, nrich = 56)
Fig. 12 Proportion of Wpoor and Wrich in case III-IV (*significant at
p < 0.05, npoor = 47, nrich = 56)
Fig. 13 Proportion of Wpoor and Wrich in case V-VI (*significant at
p < 0.05, npoor = 47, nrich = 56)
Fig. 14 Proportion of Wpoor and Wrich in case VII-VIII (*significant
at p < 0.05, npoor = 47, nrich = 56)
so compared to the scenarios in Japan. Again, the increased
observed among the Wrich were statistically insignificant. The
increased among Wpoor were significant but in scenario VI and
VII only (Fig. 13-14) — suggesting that the data poor and the
data rich were not that different in an unfarmiliar environment.
2) Perceived risks of public Wi-Fi: Next, we examined
whether the perceived risks that public Wi-Fi could be com-
promised affected the decisions to use the networks. We ran
an independent samples T-Test ((2.1) or (2.2)) where equal
variances were assumed, and not assumed, respectively) to test
whether the perceived risks were statistically different between
those deciding to use the network and those choosing not to.
t = (µ1 − µ2)/S
√
1/n1 + 1/n2 (2.1)
t = (µ1 − µ2)/
√
s21/n1 + s
2
2/n2 (2.2)
Where µ1 is the mean likelihood that participants deciding to
use public Wi-Fi perceived the network can be compromised,
µ2 is the mean likelihood from participants deciding NOT to
use the network, n1 is the number of participants deciding to
use public Wi-Fi, n2 is the number of participants deciding
NOT to, σp is the standard deviation (SD) of the total
populations, σ1 is the SD of n1, and σ2 is the SD of n2.
We used the Levene’s Test for equality of variances to de-
termine whether the data sets were subjected to (2.1) or (2.2).
If the Levene’s test returns insignificant result (p > 0.05), we
assume equal variances and apply (2.1). We also checked that
our data met the assumptions for the T-Test5.
We found that although µ2 was greater than µ1 in 28
of 32 instances, the observed differences were statistically
significant in only 2 of the 28 instances: in scenario IV which
asked participants to make an urgent financial transaction
in Japan when the remaining data allowance was at 75%
(t(101) = −2.10, p < 0.05), and in scenario VII which
asked participants to make an urgent non-financial transaction
outside Japan when the remaining data allowance is at 25%
(t(101) = −2.02, p < 0.05).
For the remaining 30 instances, the differences observed
were statistically insignificant — suggesting the decisions to
use or not to use public Wi-Fi were not significantly affected
by the participants’ perceived risks of using these networks.
We then analysed the perceived risks among the data rich
and the data poor, using the same t-tests. For the data poor, µ2
was greater than µ1 in all 32 instances but only statistically
significant in one instance asking participants to make urgent
non-financial transactions in Japan when having 50% left of
data allowance (t(37) = −2.88, p < 0.05). For the data rich,
µ2 was greater than µ1 in 24 of 32 instances, of which only
7 were statistically significant (Table II). In the 8 instances
where µ2 was less than µ1, none were statistically significant.
The results suggested that, in most cases, the perceived risks
played less of a role in the decision-making in both groups.
3) Demographic factors: We ran binomial logistic regres-
sions (3) to predict the probability of participants deciding to
use or not to use public Wi-Fi based on their demographic.
Pr(Yi = 1|Xi = xi) = exp(β0+β1xi)/(1+exp(β0+β1xi))
(3)
Where Y is a binary response variable, Yi = 1 if a participant
decides to use public Wi-Fi, Yi = 0 if a participant decides not
to use public Wi-Fi, X = (X1, X2, ..., Xk) is the independent
variable (i.e. gender, income, education level, employment).
We found a statistically significant correlation between
gender, education, and the decision to use public Wi-Fi.
51. Dependent variables measured on a continuous scale, 2. Independent
variable consist of two categorical independent groups (i.e. used vs. not used
public Wi-Fi), 3. Independence of observations, 4. No significant outliers,
5. Normally distributed dependent variables, 6. Homogeneity of variances
(tested and corrected in the Levene’s Test)
TABLE II DIFFERENCES IN THE PERCEIVED RISKS OF THE DATA
RICH DECIDING TO USE (µ1) AND NOT USE (µ2) PUBLIC WI-FI
Value
Scenario VI Scenario VII Scenario VIII
Data Level
75% 25% 100% 75% 50% 100% 50%
µ1 56.48 55.97 52.64 54.19 52.54 52.58 54.00
σ1 21.81 25.24 25.08 24.74 25.39 24.33 22.17
µ2 70.30 69.09 69.57 69.27 70.30 66.32 66.72
σ2 20.81 19.29 21.92 22.75 21.10 19.50 21.10
µ1 − µ2 -13.82* -13.12* -16.93* -15.08* -17.76* -13.74* -12.72*
t -2.33 -2.05 -2.62 - 2.31 -2.77 -2.26 -2.12
df? 48.26 51.00 51.00 51.00 51.00 50.00 50.00
σ=Standard Deviation, t=t-test result, df=Degree of Freedom,? Excluded outliers,
*Significant at p < 0.05.
a) Gender: Similar to the findings from the work of
Sombatruang et al. [33], females were more likely than males
to choose public Wi-Fi. We agreed with their explanation that
women may be less obsessive with security advice and may
have created a habit of saving data plan whenever possible.
This could also be true for women in Japan.
When the scenario asked participants to make non-urgent
financial activity in Japan, despite having 100% and 75%
left of data allowance, females were 3.86 times (β = 1.35,
OR = 3.86, p < 0.05, R2 = 0.26) and 3.42 times
(β = 1.23, OR = 3.42, p < 0.05, R2 = 0.28), respectively,
more likely. When the allowance depleted to 50%, the odds
increased to 5.62 times (β = 1.73, OR = 5.62, p < 0.05,
R2 = 0.37), showing a stronger tendency to save data. In an
urgent scenario, however, females were 3.2 times (β = 1.16,
OR = 3.20, p < 0.05, R2 = 0.29) more likely.
In Madagascar scenarios, we found a statistically significant
result only when asking participants to make an urgent non-
financial transaction — suggesting that gender played less of
a role in an unfamiliar environment. In that one case, female
were 3.68 times (β = 1.30, OR = 3.68, p < 0.05, R2 = 0.32)
more likely when having 50% left on data roaming allowance.
b) Education Level: Unlike the findings from Sombatru-
ang et al. [33]’s study which found no significant relationship
between education level and the decision to use, or not to
use, public Wi-Fi, our participants holding a bachelor or
postgraduate degree were less likely to do so than those having
finished high-school only (reference group). One possible
explanation is an exposure to cyber security awareness were
mostly at university level onward in Japan.
When the scenarios placed participants in Japan and when
they had 75%, 50%, and 25% left on data allowance, partici-
pants holding a bachelor degree were 0.15 times (β = −1.89,
OR = 0.15, p < 0.05, R2 = 0.26), 0.07 times (β = −2.67,
OR = 0.07, p < 0.01, R2 = 0.43), and 0.12 times
(β = −2.09, OR = 0.12, p < 0.05, R2 = 0.32) less
likely to decide to use public Wi-Fi to make non-urgent non-
financial transactions. In an urgent situation, they were 0.22
times (β = −1.53, OR = 0.22, p < 0.05, R2 = 0.26), 0.20
times (β = −1.64, OR = 0.20, p < 0.05, R2 = 0.23),
and 0.21 times (β = −1.58, OR = 0.21, p < 0.05, R2 =
0.26), less likely when having 100%, 75%, and 50% left on
data allowance. For financial-related transactions, participants
having a bachelor and postgraduate degree were 0.22 times
(β = −1.53, OR = 0.22, p < 0.05, R2 = 0.29) and 0.10 time
(β = −2.35, OR = 0.10, p < 0.05, R2 = 0.29), respectively,
less likely to choose public Wi-Fi in urgent scenarios and when
having 50% left on their data allowance.
However, the results from all scenarios placing parcitipants
in Madagascar were statistically insignificant. Like gender, ed-
ucation level also played less of a role in the decision-making
in an unfamiliar environment — suggesting participants were
not that different when placed outside their comfort zone.
V. DISCUSSION
We discussed the applications of our study, its limitations,
and potential future work in this section.
A. Applications
Our study has two key messages. First, the risks of public
Wi-Fi in Japan are still widespread, despite growing concern
and public knowledge about them. Second, users are likely
to keep using the networks as long as they are trapped in a
resource preservation heuristic mindset. This finding can be
applied in a number of ways that could improve security.
First, it helps us to advise the public more effectively.
Telling them not to use public Wi-Fi networks at all is probably
futile. Not everyone will have an unlimited data plan, and those
with a small data plan will keep using the networks, despite
awareness of certain risks. A more practical strategy is to urge
the public to use a reliable virtual private network (VPN) —
not just for sensitive transactions but making a habit of using it
whenever they use public Wi-Fi. In Japan, policy makers could
consider doing so in the existing security campaign such as
the International Cyber Security Campaign6 and the National
Police Agency’s Cyber Safety hotline7. Targeting the campaign
on females and students in high school may be useful as they
are more likely to use the networks. VPN providers could
also help to make it easier for users by making the app starts
automatically by default — the feature missing from many
main VPN products such as Cisco AnyConnect.
Next, we may want to shift the focus from fixing the users
to other more fixable elements. Encouraging public Wi-Fi
providers to implement secured connections is one possible
solution. Germany led an example, requiring authentication
on all public Wi-Fi hotspots [?]. The Japanese Ministry of
Internal Affairs and Communications have been discussing this
possibility [22]. Providers in Japan can also apply for a certi-
fied Secured Wi-Fi badge from the Safe Security ISP8, aiming
to promote the security of Internet Service Providers (ISP).
However, only 4 companies with a total of 70,000 hotspots
have signed up so far9. Reducing the fees (¥40,000/year) and
publicizing the initiative could be a good incentive.
We should also continue to promote app providers to encrypt
sensitive data in transit. Failure to encrypt such data, as shown
in our findings, could lead to data breaches that expose firms
to fines and reputation damages, especially in light of the new
2017 Protection of Personal Information Act in Japan [14]
and the EU General Data Protection Regulation [7]. The good
news is many big names in the tech industry have started to
take notice. For example, Apple encourages all iOS apps to
use App Transport Security (ATS)10. Google Chrome, a web
browser, also flags non-secured web sites — not only to warn
6www.nisc.go.jp/security-site/campaign
7www.npa.go.jp/cybersafety
8www.isp-ss.jp
9Information obtained directly from a representative from ISP-SS
10forums.developer.apple.com/thread/6767
users but also to encourage developers to implement HTTPS
[12]. The local providers in Japan, however, need to catch up.
Telecom operators may help by offering packages that could
dissuade users from using unsecured public Wi-Fi such as
allowing subscribers to borrow data from next month when
data allowance is low. Also, as many Japanese telecom opera-
tors offer free public Wi-Fi to subscribers, policy makers may
consider encouraging them to offer secured Wi-Fi networks.
B. Limitations and possible future works
Our study has inherent limitations. For the public Wi-Fi
experiment, there may be other sensitive data being transmitted
insecurely but not captured in our analysis. However, we
consider our findings sufficient to warrant the message that the
risks of unsecured public Wi-Fi in Japan were still at large.
For the online survey, despite our efforts to elicit good
quality responses such as using engaging scenarios, some
participants might not fully pay attention. But, this is expected
from all research using online survey. Some users may guess
the intention of the survey and gave favourable answers; but
we considered our pilot study provided sufficient rigor to
detect such biases in the design. Our survey also used hypo-
thetical scenarios; people may behave differently in real life.
Possible future studies could investigate data in a naturalistic
setting. For the econometric analysis, unravelling correlation
and causation may reflect influences from underlying vari-
ables. Fuller exploration of larger data sets would give us more
insight about the ultimate causal factors.
Moreover, the observed resource preservation heuristic may
not be truly universal as Japan and UK are developed
economies. Analysing data from developing economies would
address this limitation. Future studies could also use our
framework to investigate the effect of other resource preser-
vation heuristic in a wider context of cyber security such as
examining how the desire to save time or money influences
people to forgo security. Finally, since users constrained by
mobile data are likely to keep using unsecured public Wi-Fi,
another useful future work is seeking interventions that help
them to create a habit of using VPN.
VI. CONCLUSION
Our study shows a concerning but important conclusion. De-
spite growing knowledge and media reports about unsecured
public Wi-Fi networks, the risks continued; many applications
still did not encrypt sensitive data-in-motion and many users
continued to use the networks for sensitive transactions.
We highlighted the resource preservation heuristic — the
desire to save mobile data allowance — as a particular root
cause for influencing users’ decision-making. We also showed
that the perceived risks of public Wi-Fi played less of a role in
the decision-making. Our study is the first to have examined
these two factors using rigorous statistical tests and provided
a framework for future study wishing to investigate resource
preservation in a wider context of cyber security.
Our findings called for a more workable solution to mitigate
the risks of unsecured public Wi-Fi. Urging users to make a
habit of using a VPN when on public Wi-Fi is more plausible
than stopping them from using it entirely. Greater emphasis
is also needed on app providers to encrypt sensitive data-in-
motion and on public Wi-Fi providers to offer secured Wi-Fi.
Telecom operator could also help by offering data plan that
allow users to borrow data from next month — essentially
interfering the intrusive thoughts about running out of data
that instigates the unwanted resource preservation heuristic.
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APPENDIX
A. Locations of public Wi-Fi experiment
• Kintetsu Nara Train Station
• JR Nara Train Station
• On a train from Yamato Saidaiji Station to Kintetsu Nara Station
• Nara Tourist Information Centre (within the vicinity of JR Nara Train Station)
• Higashimuki Shopping Street
• Sanjodori Shopping Street
• Konishi Sakura Dori Shopping Street
• Kohfukuji Temple
• Gangoji Temple
• Nara National Museum (outside)
• Sarusawa-Ike pond
B. Demographics of survey participants
Age Annual Income n %
Mean 42.54 <¥2,000,000 5 5
Median 40.00 >2,000,000 but 6¥4,000,000 22 21
Mode 35.00 >¥4,000,000 but 6¥6,000,000 19 18
S.D. 12.46 >¥6,000,000 but 6¥8,000,000 16 16
Min 20.00 >¥8,000,000 but 6¥10,000,000 12 12
Max 75.00 >¥10,000,000 but 6¥12,000,000 4 4
>¥12,000,000 but 6¥15,000,000 3 3
Gender n % >¥15,000,000 but 6¥20,000,000 4 4
Male 58 56 >¥20,000,000 2 2
Female 45 44 Do not know 9 9
Total 103 100 No Answer 7 7
Total 103 100
Education n %
High school graduate 23 22 Current Region of Resident n %
Diploma/Vocation training 34 33 Tokyo 13 13
Bachelor degree 38 37 Kanto (but not Tokyo) 23 22
Postgraduate 8 8 Chubu 18 17
Total 103 100 Kansai 21 20
Kyushu 9 9
Employment Status n % Shikoku 5 5
Not working - Full time student 2 2 Chugoku 5 5
Not working - Sick/disable 2 2 Tohoku 3 3
Not working - Retired 3 3 Hokkaido 6 6
Not working - Others 17 17 Total 103 100
Working - Part time 15 15
Working - Full time 61 59
Working - Others 3 3
Total 103 100
